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Russell’s Progress
Spatial Dimensions, the From-Which, and the At-Which
Kant’s critical philosophy brought space (and time) to the forefront of philosoph-
ical attention. Regarding space as the form of outer sense, his critical doctrines
purported to establish that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, knowledge
that describes and constrains any possible human experience of space. The im-
plication was that the very same form of intuition governs all appearances of spa-
tial structure, including all possible sensory experience and the pure intuition of
a priori imagination.
During the nineteenth century, philosophers, sensory physiologists, and sen-
sory psychologists responded to Kant’s doctrine of space in various ways.¹ Some
took his doctrine to be in fact a psychological proposal about the innateness of
spatial perception and sought to support or refute it on those grounds. Others
believed that the doctrine was intended to explain the possibility of geometrical
knowledge. Some philosophers, including Bertrand Russell, held that Kant was
seeking to establish a necessary relation between geometry and physical space,
founded upon space as a form of intuition. Russell held that Kant’s doctrine was
refuted by the existence of non-Euclidean geometries, which made the question
of the actual geometrical structure of physical space into an empirical matter.²
There is a variety of opinion on the relation between Kant’s arguments that
space is an a priori form of intuition and his theory of geometrical knowledge,
which draws on that doctrine. Some interpreters contend that Kant’s arguments
for the apriority and the intuitional nature of space are separate from his theory
of geometry,³ while others ૝nd them to be more closely related.⁴ In this litera-
ture, Strawson emphasized the “phenomenal interpretation” of Kant’s theory of
geometry: that Kant was addressing, in the ૝rst instance, the structure of space as
experienced phenomenally and claiming that this space is of necessity described
by Euclid’s geometry. Citing Russell, he reports that the progress of pure mathe-
1 Gary Hat૝eld, The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to
Helmholtz (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).
2 Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1938), 372; the
૝rst edition was published in 1903.
3 Rolf-Peter Horstmann, “Space as Intuition and Geometry: Observations on Kant’s Transcen-
dental Aesthetic,” in Ratio 18 (1976), 18–30.
4 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London:
Methuen, 1966), 60, 66–7, 277.
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matics and physics in the twentieth century rendered the phenomenal structure
of space less important, because:
on the one hand, rigour in mathematics turns on logic, not on looks – which is why Russell
said that the development of mathematics showed Kant’s Anschauung to be superૠuous;
and, on the other hand, the physical applications of geometry turn on physical tests and
measurements of many kinds, and not on the mere contemplation of phenomenal appear-
ances.⁵
Strawsonaccurately reports thatRussell himself separatedgeometry aspuremath-
ematics from the empirical determination of the geometry of physical space and
that he believed that the rigorization of mathematics took it away from appeals to
spatial experience. But Strawson underestimates the importance of phenomenal
spatial appearances in Russell’s theory of knowledge and hence in any knowledge
of physical space.
I have rehearsed these themes concerninggeometry andphysical space inpart
so as to specify my topic more closely. I want to focus on a question in Russell that
has to donotwith the foundations of geometry or, to beginwith, the speci૝c geom-
etry of physical space, but ratherwith the relation between the sensory experience
of the spatial properties of objects and knowledge of a public spatial order. Thus,
although Strawson’s observation about the inadequacy of bare phenomenal looks
may apply to speci૝c problems addressed in Russell’s philosophy of physics (viz.,
determining the precise structure of physical space), it does not hold with respect
tohismore general epistemologyas applied to the spatial properties of things. Any
claims about the spatial properties of objects in physical space, includingmeasur-
ing instruments, are for Russell based on perceptual experience.
My topic concerns some aspects of Russell’s epistemological turn in the pe-
riod aૡer 1911. In particular, it focuses on two aspects of his philosophy in this
period: his attempt to render material objects as constructions out of sense data,
and his attitude toward sense data as “hard data.” These aspects are epistemo-
logical and metaphysical. They involve commitments to the existence of certain
sorts of entities, paired, not with the denial of other entities, but with a decision
not to include other entities in the general scheme of being that Russell develops;
and they involve a discussion of the sort ofmetaphysical commitments that would
allow, as regards the objects around us, the positing of easily knowable entities
as their basis.
5 Ibid., 286.
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In considering this topic, I focus on Russell’s “breakthrough” of early 1914,
in which he concluded that, viewed from the standpoint of epistemology and an-
alytic construction, space has six dimensions, not merely three. In this scheme,
Russell posits a three-dimensional personal or “perspective” space that is inhab-
ited by sense data. This space then forms the basis for constructing the three-
dimensional space of physics (and of public things). I am concerned with the
speci૝cs of this construction: with the properties of the private spaces, the rela-
tions among those spaces, and their relation to physical space and to constructed
“things,” such as pennies or tables. I ૝nd that there are di૘culties of interpre-
tation with respect to these relations, which stem from the di૘culty of ૝nding
a coherent interpretation of Russell’s claim that objects such as tables and pen-
nies look smaller at a greater distance (or look trapezoidal or elliptical from some
points of view). I don’t mean to challenge the phenomenal claim that objects do,
in some sense, look small in the distance. Rather, I raise di૘culties with Rus-
sell’s analysis of this fact, in which he appeals to both phenomenal experience
and the ૝ndings of sensory psychology. I hold that if he wishes to maintain his
phenomenal claimabout objects appearing smallerwith greater distance, hemust
alter or redescribe aspects of his construction of ordinary things. However, if his
construction of things and physical space is based on a problematic description
of the private spaces, then his claim that private or perspective spaces are very
well known and provide the hard data for knowledge of the physical world faces
a challenge.
In the ૝rst section, I review the place of sense data in Russell’s philosophical
development aૡer 1911. I then consider: his “breakthrough”; the ૝ndings of sen-
sory psychology that he invoked in connection with it; some problems that arise,
both for Russell and textbook psychology, in connection with the perception of
size; and ૝nally some problems for Russell’s use of this psychology in describing
the “hard” sense data at the basis of his constructions, alongwith some directions
in which he might seek a solution. I end with a brief consideration of why expe-
rientially based knowledge of spatial items is crucial for Russell in a way that it is
not for Kant.
1 Russell and Sense Data
The part of Russell’s metaphysics that is our focus concerns his e૗ort to render
the material world, including the world of physical science, as a construction out
of sense data. Russell worked at this project from sometime in 1912 through the
Analysis of Matter in 1927. He did not sustain the same metaphysics throughout:
indeed, within the range of years just indicated, he switched from endorsing a
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representative realismwith inferred physical entities in Problems of Philosophy; to
adopting a metaphysics of sense data and subjects who apprehend them later in
1912, according towhichmatter is constructed; to accepting the position that there
exists only neutral stu૗, that is, to his accepting late in 1918 the neutral monism
of William James.⁶
Russell’s e૗ort to construct physical objects and theoretical entities fromsense
data begins with the sense data themselves. From sometime in the ૝rst decade of
the century onward, Russell was a realist about sense data. In his autobiographi-
cal reconstruction of this period, he emphasizes the initial pluralistic realism that
he shared with Moore: the real is not one, but many, and objects are known di-
rectly, as in naïve realism.⁷ In his writings on sense data from 1912–14, he stresses
a second position that he shared with Moore, the mind-independence of sense
data: that they exist independently of our perception of them, even while we per-
ceive them.⁸ Accordingly, Russell distinguished sensation, as the mental act by
which we are aware of sense data, from sense data as objects of which we are
aware. Considering the question of whether the immediate objects of sense are
mental entities or at least are in some sense mind-dependent, in Our Knowledge
of the External World, the Lowell lectures in Boston from 1914, Russell held them
to be physiologically conditioned but mind-independent:
I think it must be admitted as probable that the immediate objects of sense depend for their
existence upon physiological conditions in ourselves, and that, for example, the coloured
surfaces which we see cease to exist when we shut our eyes. But it would be a mistake to
infer that they are dependent on the mind, not real while we see them, or not the sole basis
for our knowledge of the external world.⁹
6 On Russell’s adoption of neutral monism, see Hat૝eld, “Sense-Data and the Philosophy of
Mind: Russell, James, and Mach,” in Principia 6 (2003), 203–30, and “Sense Data and the
Mind–Body Problem,” in Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, ed. R. Schu-
macher (Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, 2004), 305–31.
7 Russell, My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 61–2; G. E.
Moore’s well-known “Refutation of Idealism,” in Mind n.s. 12 (1903), 433–53, in e૗ect endorses
a naïve realism, according to which we are directly aware of “the existence of a table in space”
in the same way in which we are directly aware of the conscious element that accompanies every
mental fact (453).
8 Moore, in “The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 6 (1905–6), 68–127, distinguished “sense-contents” as non-mental from the mental acts
by which we apprehend them; in “The Subject-Matter of Psychology,” in Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society 10 (1909–10), 36–62, he made the same point, now using the term “sense data.”
9 Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scienti૛c Method in Philosophy
(Chicago: Open Court, 1914), 64; hereaૡer, OKEW.
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In a paper from the same time, “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics,” he as-
serted that sense data are “physical,” not mental, by which he meant that they
are mind-independent and did not mean that they are composed of the elemen-
tary particles of physics.¹⁰
Why posit sense data as distinct from ordinary external objects? Russell ac-
cepted the arguments from perceptual variation. The table appears rectangular
from one view, trapezoidal from another; brown from one view, glaring whitish
grey from another. The coin appears now elliptical, now circular, now larger, now
smaller, depending on viewing angle and distance. We believe that the color and
shape of the real table and coin do not change from moment to moment; but the
“data” that we see do change. Russell concluded that sense data are not parts
of the objects themselves, and he posited them as entities distinct from really ex-
isting physical objects.¹¹ But then in 1912–14 he came to believe that he could do
awaywith really existing physical objects as usually conceived and achieve amore
economical ontology involving only two types of entity: subjects and data. Ordi-
nary objects and microphysical processes had, in Problems, been things known
by inference from sense data. Now they would be regarded not as inferred entities
but as logical constructions or indeed as logical ૝ctions.¹²
One of Russell’s motivations for retaining sense data and jettisoning physical
matter was epistemological: sense data are very well known. In the language of
the Lowell lectures, he described them as the “hard data” from which he would
construct the “things” of common sense and science. In calling the thing a “mere
logical construction” or comparing it to a “૝ction,” he meant to say that it doesn’t
exist, or rather it needn’t be held to exist.¹³ Accordingly, only these particulars
exist: sense data; the subjective acts of their apprehension; and, most likely, the
domain of sensibilia – entities very like sense data that exist at places where there
isn’t anyone to see them at present. The sensibilia are not physiologically condi-
tioned, which is why they are only “very similar” to sense data. The fact of phys-
iological conditioning is an empirical regularity within our sense data: e.g., that
staring at a bright light yields an aૡerimage that a૗ects our
10 Russell, “Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” (hereaૡer, RSDP), in Scientia 16 (1914), 1–27, as
reprinted in Russell, Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1963), 108–31, on p. 112.
11 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 12, 22–5; the
૝rst edition was published in 1912.
12 OKEW, vi; RSDP, 115.
13 Russell, OKEW, 70–2, 89; “Ultimate Constituents of Matter” (hereaૡer, UCM), in Monist 25
(1915), 399–417, as reprinted inMysticism and Logic, 94–107, on p. 102; RSDP, 115.
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visual experience for several minutes and about which we can construct explana-
tions in the ૝ctional language of physics and physiology.
If sense data are the “hard data” Russell takes them to be, the well-known
items that are the basis for all other knowledge of the external world, then he
should be clear about their phenomenal properties. For vision, these properties
are colors, shapes, distances, and sizes. Russell worked on the structure of sense
data and their spatial relations to one another in 1912–14. In January, 1914, he had
what he considered a breakthrough, which caused him to emend the manuscript
of the Lowell Lectures.¹⁴ This breakthrough led him to the notion of a six-dimen-
sional spatial construction, which related the private spaces of sense data to a
constructed public space that could be known by all. I want to explore the spatial
structure especially of the private spaces, as these are the (ostensibly) well-known
data at the foundation of Russell’s system.
2 Russell’s “Breakthrough” and Six-Dimensional Space
In Problems, Russell o૗ered a familiar description of sense data according to
which, from most normal points of view, a table is seen as having a trapezoidal
shape; or rather, if we carefully attend to our sense data of the table, we will no-
tice that they are trapezoidal:
We are all in the habit of judging as to the “real” shapes of things, and we do this so unre-
ૠectingly that we come to think we actually see the real shapes. But, in fact, as we all have
to learn if we try to draw, a given thing looks di૗erent in shape from every di૗erent point of
view. If our table is “really” rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it
had two acute angles and two obtuse angles. If the opposite sides are parallel, they will look
as if they converged to a point away from the spectator; if they are of equal length, they will
look as if the nearer side were longer. All these things are not commonly noticed in looking
at a table, because experience has taught us to construct the “real” shape from the apparent
shape, and the “real” shape is what interests us as practical men.¹⁵
There are two things to notice about this passage. First, Russell describes what
he otherwise calls the sense data (here: appearances) of the table as if they were
perspective projections; he describes the apparent shape as trapezoidal and com-
pares it to the shape of the table as we would draw it. He does not indicate that
the sense datum is experienced at a distance, but he does not say it is experienced
14 Kenneth Blackwell, “Our Knowledge of Our Knowledge,” in Russell: The Journal of Bertrand
Russell Studies 12 (1973), 11–13. RSDP records the breakthrough.
15 Russell, Problems, 10–11.
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internally or in the eye, either, and I believe the presumption is that the trape-
zoidal shape is experienced roughly in the location of the table. Second, he tacitly
appeals to psychological theories of shape perception, according to which, as a
result of experience, we perceive (or think that we perceive) the table top as a rect-
angle in its proper location.¹⁶
Russell’s position in Problems was subject to two sorts of objection. One type
of objection was more generally abroad concerning sense data, and has become
known as Stout’s postulate, according to which, as described recently by Nasim,
“one and the same thing cannot have more than one sensible quality at one and
the same place” (at the same time, one presumes).¹⁷ If four people view the same
rectangular table from positions standing back from each of the four sides, they
see four di૗erent trapezoidal sense data; even if the trapezoids seen from either
end should by coincidence be congruent (the viewers have the same height and
are in exactly similar positions), they show di૗erent sides of the table as being
longer and shorter (for each, the near side is the longer). If one assumes that they
are seeing these data as being at the position of the real table, then the data violate
Stout’s postulate. But T. P. Nunn replied that, if the various sense data are in the
private spaces of distinct observers, then they are not literally together occupying
the same location at the same time. In this regard, the public object must be seen
as a construction based on the private elements. We shall see that Russell, in his
“breakthrough,” draws from Nunn’s suggestion (and he in fact cites Nunn).¹⁸
The second objection was conveyed to Russell by Whitehead, as part of a
fourteen-page critical response to a prepublication manuscript version of Prob-
lems. Whitehead wrote to his former pupil: “As to the ‘shape of the table’. Why
assume that our perception of space is two-dimensional? Perhaps you don’t. I
16 G. E. Stout, Analytical Psychology, 2 vols. (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1896), 2:21–3, o૗ers
a position similar to Russell’s, asserting that we merely think of the real shape, without forming
an image of it, which goes along with Russell’s statement that “we come to think we actually see
the real shapes,” which might suggest that we don’t actually see them (form an image of them).
W. James, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Holt, 1890), 2:238–40, by contrast, suggests
that we habitually replace the sensation of a projective shapewith an image of the real shape seen
from an ideally revealing point of view (so as to capture symmetry and equality of sides, if these
exist). This could be Russell’s position if we think that the “construction” of the real shape is a
phenomenal construction. Russell read these works by Stout and James in 1894–96; see Russell,
“What Shall I Read?” inCambridge Essays, 1888–99, ed. K. Blackwell et al. (London: GeorgeAllen
and Unwin, 1983), 345–70, on pp. 354–5, 357.
17 OmarW. Nasim, Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers (Houndmills, England: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2008), p. 6.
18 RSDP, 113, citing T. P. Nunn, “Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception?” in Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society 10 (1909–10), 191–218.
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can’t get a decisive instance just now. But the general impression on my mind is
that you do. Surely such an assumption is false psychology.”¹⁹ Whitehead as-
sumes from Russell’s description that the sense data are two-dimensional, but
he also correctly points out that there is no passage from which it can be seen
that Russell decisively held this position (at least there is none to be found in the
published version of Problems). All the same, in the six-dimensional construc-
tion of the “breakthrough,” Russell explicitly renders his private spaces as three-
dimensional. He also may have gleaned an idea from Whitehead’s materials in-
tended for the fourth volume of PrincipiaMathematica (but never published in the
form Russell saw them, and later destroyed),²⁰ involving the distinction between
the “from which” and the “at which.”²¹
Russell’s breakthrough from January, 1914, is recorded in the paper “The Re-
lation of Sense-Data to Physics” (written in the ૝rst week of January). Russell re-
sponded to the above problems with his six-dimensional account of space.
Russell’s six-dimensional space consists of two three-dimensional spaces: a
private one and a public one that is constructed from it.²² The private spaces are
each experienced by an individual. These spaces have a three-dimensional struc-
ture that constitutes a “perspective” or point of view. As Russell explains, “two
places of di૗erent sorts are associated with every ‘sense datum’, namely the place
at which it is and the place from which it is perceived.”²³ The from-which may be
thought of as the phenomenal position of the subject or percipient, the place from
which the subject perceives the world. The at-which is the location of the datum,
19 Victor Lowe, “Whitehead’s 1911 Criticism of The Problems of Philosophy,” in Russell: Journal
of the Bertrand Russell Archives 13 (1974), 3–11, on p. 5.
20 Ibid., p. 3. Some of the ideas contained in these papers were published by Whitehead in 1919
and 1920, on which, see Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, Bertrand Russell’s Dialogue with His Contem-
poraries (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 121. Famously, in the preface to
OKEW (p. vi), Russell credited Whitehead with his changed position from Problems, saying: “I
owe to him the de૝nition of points, the suggestion for the treatment of instants and ‘things,’ and
the whole conception of the world of physics as a construction rather than an inference.” As is
well known (see, e.g., Eames, Russell’s Dialogue, 103, 118–21), Whitehead was not pleased with
the use to which Russell put these ideas, and he refused to send Russell any more of his “notes”
and asked him not to discuss his ideas (in a letter from 1917).
21 A distinction similar to Russell’s between the from-which and the at-which appears in A. N.
Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1919), 85, 189, and The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1920), ch. 5. The distinction is notworked out in such away that it adds to Russell’s version,
and the relation between these later publications and Whitehead’s earlier “notes” is not clear.
22 RSDP, 119: “The world which we have so far constructed is a world of six dimensions, since it
is a three-dimensional series of perspectives, each of which is itself three-dimensional.”
23 RSDP, 117.
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perceived to be at a certain distance (the space is three-dimensional) and having
a shape and size as experienced from the from-which. As Russell elaborates:
each person, so far as his sense-data are concerned, lives in a private world. This private
world contains its own space […] . The place at which a sense datum is, is a place in pri-
vate space. This place therefore is di૗erent from any place in the private space of another
percipient.²⁴
These private spaces would seem to speak to both of the problems from Problems.
They obviate, in Russell’s words, the problem “of combining what we call di૗er-
ent appearances of the same thing in the same place,”²⁵ since the place of each
at-which occurs only in the private space of the individual. Further, Russell here
makes clear that the private spaces are three dimensional; the relation between
the from-which and the at-whichmust be supposed to include a distance at which
the datum is seen. Although not crucial for our purposes, Russell augments the
actual private spaces of individuals with additional locations, from-whiches, that
correspond to the points of view from which a sense datum would be observed if
anyone were there; in these cases, the postulated entity located in the at-which
is called a “sensibile” and amounts to an unsensed sense datum (occurring mi-
nus the e૗ects of any physiological conditioning, as can accrue with actual per-
ceivers).²⁶
The second three-dimensional space is the public or physical space of “per-
spectives” or points of view. It is essentially an ordering of the from-which lo-
cations, that is, the places from which each perceiver experiences a datum. He
introduces this space as follows:
In addition to theprivate spacesbelonging to theprivateworlds of di૗erent percipients, there
is, however, another space, in which one whole private world counts as a point, or at least
as a spatial unit. This might be described as the space of points of view, since each private
world may be regarded as the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point
of view. I prefer, however, to speak of it as the space of perspectives, in order to obviate the
suggestion that a private world is only real when someone views it.²⁷
The various from-whiches, or perspective units, can, according to Russell, be or-
dered so as to produce “the one all-embracing space of physics.”²⁸ To each po-
24 RSDP, 117. Sajahan Miah, Russell’s Theory of Perception, 1905–1919 (London: Continuum,
2006), 158, implausibly makes the “at-which” a location in public space. Rather, locations in
public space are constructed from the from-whiches.
25 RSDP, 118.
26 RSDP, 110–11.
27 RSDP, 118.
28 RSDP, 119
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sition relative to a table, or, more conveniently, to a penny, an entire domain of
private worlds can be imagined, each addressing the penny from a location so as
to yield an appearance of a speci૝c size and shape. These sizes and shapes are
similar enough to be compared among perceivers through language,²⁹ and they
therefore can serve as a basis for ordering the positions from-which into a set of
locations that de૝ne the penny considered as a “public” object. Once these loca-
tions are determined, the notion of the penny as a real material thing is no longer
of use, and it is reduced to the class of its appearances.
For our purposes, the crucial aspect of the construction of public space and
material things is that it is accomplished, in Russell’s view, by an ordering of pri-
vate spaces according to their similarities and relations to one another. Russell
explains the process:
The arrangement of perspectives in a space is e૗ected by means of the di૗erences between
the appearances of a given thing in the various perspectives. Suppose, say, that a certain
penny appears in a number of di૗erent perspectives; in some it looks larger and in some
smaller, in some it looks circular, in others it presents the appearance of an ellipse of varying
eccentricity. We may collect together all those perspectives in which the appearance of the
penny is circular. These we will place on one straight line, ordering them in a series by
the variations in the apparent size of the penny. […] By such means, all those perspectives
in which the penny presents a visual appearance can be arranged in a three-dimensional
spatial order.³⁰
It must be remembered that there is no material penny, in the usual sense. The
penny is the class of its appearances. In considering a material penny as a ૝ctive
construction, wemayhold that “thematter of a thing is the limit of its appearances
as their distance from the thing diminishes.”³¹ Talk of the penny “appearing” in
the perspectives is a way of characterizing the class of sense data that are all “as
of” a single material thing. This classi૝cation must be able to be achieved simply
by comparing sense data empirically. Whether this project is workable in general
is not my present concern.³² Assuming for the sake of argument that the appear-
ances can be ordered as he says, I want to look into the speci૝c structure of the
private spaces. In doing so, I will raise some questions about the coherence of this
description, questions that were availablewithin the conceptual framework in the
psychology of perception of his time, and which apply more generally to the no-
29 RSDP, 117.
30 RSDP, 118–19.
31 RSDP, 121.
32 Miah, Russell’s Theory of Perception, ch. 7, collects many objections to Russell’s constructivist
project.
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tion of the penny looking smaller at a greater distance and looking elliptical from
an angle.
3 Russell among the Psychologists
In ordering the sense data of the penny, Russell appeals to their “apparent sizes.”
The smaller the apparent size (as of the same penny), the farther away the from-
which from the constructed location of the penny. Russell might also have ap-
pealed to their apparent shapes, to the e૗ect that, the greater the eccentricity of
the ellipse, the farther the from-which is (as regards viewing angle) from a line
perpendicular to and through the center of the upward facing disc of the penny.
Russell also o૗ers a di૗erent description of the series of phenomenal sizes.
Instead of equating the series with apparent sizes, he relates them to the amount
of visual ૝eld taken up:
When a number of people are said to see the same object, thosewhowould be said to be near
to the object see a particular occupying a larger part of their ૝eld of vision than is occupied
by the corresponding particular seen by people who would be said to be farther from the
thing. Bymeans of such considerations it is possible, in wayswhich need not now be further
speci૝ed, to arrange all the di૗erent spaces in a three-dimensional series.³³
While this may seem equivalent to talk of apparent size, it is not. Occupying a
larger part of the visual ૝eld is a matter of the visual angle an object subtends.
Visual angle does vary as Russell says: for an object of constant size viewed head
on (as with the penny), the object will take up more of the visual ૝eld the closer
the vantage point (or from-which) is to the object. But, as discussed in the next
section, the perceived size of an object is a function of both visual angle and the
perceived distance to the object.
Both of Russell’s descriptions connect with the language used by psycholo-
gists, and indeed in his discussion of “hard data” in Our Knowledge, he makes
clear his dependence on the ૝ndings of psychology. He observes that:
Psychologists […] have made us aware that what is actually given is much less than most
people would naturally suppose, and that much of what at ૝rst sight seems to be given is
really inferred. This applies especially in regard to our space-perceptions. For instance, we
instinctively infer the “real” size and shape of a visible object from its apparent size and
shape, according to its distance and our point of view.³⁴
33 UCM, 103–4.
34 OKEW, 68.
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Here againwehave talk of apparent size and shape, andnowdistance is brought in
as something that is added to what Russell may well have considered to be a two-
dimensional sense datum. Russell notes that the “real” size “at ૝rst sight seems to
be given,” suggesting that the real size is in some sense phenomenally present; but
it remains unclear whether he still holds the position from Problems, according to
which we merely “come to think we actually see the real shapes” and presumably
sizes, a phrasing which allows that we merely mistakenly believe that we see the
real size. The above passage occurs in the portion of the Lowell lectures thought to
have been composed before the breakthrough in January, 1914.³⁵ The part inserted
aૡer the breakthrough goes through the six-dimensional space, using much the
same language as “Relation of Sense-Data to Physics.”
Russell’s description of the appearances of the penny accords with some de-
scriptions of apparent size and shape in a psychological account with which he
was familiar. G. E. Stout, whose psychology textbook Russell read and who was
one of his teachers at Cambridge, o૗ers a position that is similar to Russell’s pre-
breakthrough discussion in Our Knowledge. He reports that in visual perception
we actually experience a visual magnitude that accords with visual angle and a
visual shape that accords with the projective shape of the object as seen from a
particular point of view. We then infer the real size and forget the apparent size.
But, interestingly, he asserts that this real size is not present to us phenomenally.
Here is what Stout says:
If we attend to the visual appearance rather than to the object, we ૝nd that it varies in size
according to our distance from the thing seen. At great distances this variation is forcedupon
our notice. Looking down from a high tower on men walking in the streets of a town, we
remark with a kind of surprise how small they look. But for comparatively short distances
the variation passes unnoticed unless we expressly measure the visual angle. The reason
is that the visual magnitude, as such, is habitually disregarded, serving only as a sign of
the real magnitude. But this real magnitude, in its distinction from apparent magnitude,
is neither actually seen nor mentally visualized. Nor is it represented by an ideally revived
tactual or motor complex. There is no trace of such a complex in consciousness.³⁶
There are three points to note. First, Stout a૘rms a phenomenology of things
looking smaller at a distance, according to visual angle. Second, he remarks that,
such appearances are overlooked in favor of the real magnitude (by a process he
has characterized as an inference). Third, he reports that this real magnitude is
not present in consciousness as a visual content, that is, as a phenomenal spatial
extent that corresponds to the real magnitude. These positions accord at least
35 Blackwell, “Our Knowledge”, 13.
36 Stout, Analytical Psychology, 2:22–3.
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partially with Russell’s pre-breakthrough report of what “the psychologists” have
revealed. A potential discrepancy is that Stout suggests that themen are both seen
at a distance and look small, while Russell in the passage above writes that, when
we take distance into account, we get to real size.
As it happens, the relations among visual angle, apparent size, distance, and
real size are a problem for both Stout and Russell, and could have been seen to
be so on the basis of other psychological literature produced in England, some at
Cambridge, during the latter decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth century.
4 Problems with Perceived Size
By Russell’s day, the relations among visual angle, apparent size, distance, and
real size had long been studied in the optical tradition and were under intense
investigation in sensory psychology. From the time of Ibn al-Haytham and Des-
cartes, it was known that, for adult perceivers, perceived size depends on both vi-
sual angle and perceived distance.³⁷ Visual angle varies inversely with distance.
The perception of size involves both visual angle and perceived distance. Con-
sider an example in which a smaller object at a closer distance takes up the same
visual angle as a larger object at a farther distance (Fig. 1a). Assuming that visual
angle is accurately recorded by the visual system³⁸ and that distance is accurately
perceived, both objects are perceivedwith their true sizes (a perceptual result later
knownas “size constancy”). If twoobjects of di૗erent size are at the samedistance
from the eye, then the smaller one subtends a smaller visual angle (Fig. 1b); if the
distance is accurately perceived, then the sizes of the two objects are accurately
perceived.
A further factor arose with Kepler’s discovery of the retinal image. Visual an-
gle can be de૝ned by relations among directions in the ૝eld of view. Once Kepler
accurately characterized the optics of the retinal image, it became known that the
visual angle subtended by an object corresponds to the size of the image that the
37 See Gary Hat૝eld and William Epstein, “The Sensory Core and the Medieval Foundations of
Early Modern Perceptual Theory,” in Isis 70 (1979), 363–84.
38 In what follows, I assume that the visual system is basically accurate in recording visual an-
gles, or visual directions. This is a separate matter from whether perceivers are good at judging
visual angles. It simply assumes that we see things in the direction that they actually are. When
both eyes are open, especially for near distances visual angle is constructed in relation to the
“cyclopean eye.” For a discussion, see Maurice Hershenson, Visual Space Perception: A Primer
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), ch. 2.
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Fig. 1: Part (a) shows how two objects of di૕erent sizes (A and B) can subtend the same visual an-
gle when placed at di૕erent distances from the perceiver P. Assuming that visual angle (or visual
direction) is accurately registered by the visual system, then, if distance is perceived veridically,
A and B are perceived with their true sizes. Part (b) shows how the same two objects relate to the
perceiver when they are the same distance away. The smaller object (A) subtends a smaller visual
angle. Again, if distance is perceived veridically, then both A and B are perceived with their true
sizes.
object projects onto the retina. The larger the retinal projection, the larger the vi-
sual angle. This relation includes the previous one: a larger and a smaller object
at the same distance have larger and smaller retinal projections, but if distance
is accurately perceived their di૗ering sizes are accurately perceived; further, they
can be placed in such a way that they project the same size onto the retina and,
again, if distance is accurately perceived, the objects are perceived with their true
sizes.
Kepler’s ૝nding led to the question of whether perceivers are aware of retinal
image size and also of the shapes that objects project onto the retina. In the case of
the penny, the retinal image size varies inversely with distance, so that, when far-
ther away, the penny projects a smaller size. Similarly, when viewed straight on,
the penny projects a circle, but when viewed from an angle, as this angle diverges
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from straight on, the penny projects ellipses of increasing eccentricity (until the
penny projects an elongated rectangle, when viewed from the side).³⁹
These facts thus far only specify the sizes and shapes of images projected on
the retina. Except when the retinal values are combined with a perception of dis-
tance, these facts don’t specify a visual experience of an object with a shape and
size at a distance. Theorists varied in their interpretation of what sorts of expe-
riences perceivers have of projective values. Some theorists spoke of perceiving
or having sensations or visual appearances that correspond to the retinal projec-
tions: for a given object, it is smaller in sensation at greater distance, and its shape
in sensation varieswith viewing angle. But the question ofwhere these sensations
appear to be became problematic. Berkeley placed them “in the mind,” Reid had
them at “no distance from the eye.” Stout didn’t specify.⁴⁰
Others, such as James Sully, in his widely known textbooks, contended that
the notion of a two-dimensional sensation that is experienced in adult life is a ૝c-
tion. He held that adults always localize and experience sensations as being at
some distance.⁴¹ This distance may be perceived more or less accurately. Writ-
ers on vision at Russell’s Cambridge, including W.H. R. Rivers and C. S. Myers,
observed that perceived size (or magnitude) is determined by retinal image size
together with perceived distance. Here is how Rivers explained the relation and
an instance of its empirical manifestation:
The two chief factors on which depends the perception of the size of an object are the size
of the retinal image and the estimated distance of the object. The importance of the latter
factor is shown by an aૡer-image experiment. If the aૡer-image of an object is projected on a
moving screen, it will be seen to change in size, becoming smaller as the screen approaches
the eyes, larger as it recedes. The retinal image uponwhich the aૡer-image depends remains
constant in size, and the changes in apparent magnitude depend on the projection. Emmert
measured the aૡer-image at di૗erent distances, and found the linear size of the image equal
to the linear size of the object, multiplied by the distance at which the image was seen.⁴²
39 Although one might carry through this discussion using the examples of both diminishing
size with distance and altered shape with viewing angle, henceforth I focus on the former. It is
emphasized by Russell in RSDP, and the psychological literature of his time is better developed
on this topic.
40 George Berkeley, An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (Dublin: Rhames and Papyat,
1709), § 41; Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: Bell and Creech,
1785), ch. 6, sec. 23, p. 416; Stout, Analytic Psychology, 2:22–3.
41 James Sully, Outlines of Psychology (New York: Appleton, 1886), 149, 181, and The Human
Mind: A Text-Book of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Appleton, 1892), 1:208, 245.
42 W.H. R. Rivers, “Vision,” in Text-Book of Physiology, ed. E. A. Schäfer, 2 vols. (Edinburgh:
Pentland, 1898–1900), 2:1026–1148, on pp. 1139–40. An abbreviated account is given by C. S. My-
ers, A Text-Book of Experimental Psychology, Part I, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
332 Hat૚eld
In speaking of “projection,” Rivers means that a subjective phenomenon, such as
an aૡerimage, is perceived as localized at a speci૝c location – in this case, on the
surface of a screen. He notes that in Emmert’s experiment, the size of the aૡerim-
age varies directly with the distance at which the screen is placed. This relation,
which speci૝es that perceived size is a function of visual angle and perceived dis-
tance, is known as “Emmert’s law.”⁴³ Rivers generalizes the function to apply to
the relations among visual angle, perceived distance, and perceived size in nor-
mal perception; the function later became known as the size-distance invariance
relation.⁴⁴ According to this relation (Fig. 2a), if distance is veridically perceived,
size is veridical (size constancy is attained); if distance is underperceived, size is
underperceived, etc.
For present purposes, the most interesting feature of Rivers’s description is
that, as the aૡerimage is perceived as being at a greater distance, its size increases.
This is exactly the opposite of Russell’s account of the penny, in which apparent
size decreases with distance. What is going on?
Russell, in describing the penny, is describing the perceived size of an ob-
ject of ૝xed physical size as it recedes (Fig. 2b). It is unclear from his descrip-
tion whether he means to be describing the diminishing retinal-image size of the
penny, its diminishing visual angle, or merely to be reporting a fact about how
phenomenal size changes with increasing distance. Rivers is describing a situ-
ation in which a constant visual angle or retinal size (the physiological process
underlying the aૡerimage, which remains constant on the retina) is paired with
di૗ering distances. He ૝nds that, for a constant visual angle, perceived size in-
creases with perceived distance, in accordance with Emmert’s law.
Thus far, there is no direct contradiction between Rivers and Russell. But
Rivers’s description entails that, in Russell’s situation, if the distance to the penny
Press, 1911), ch. 22. Russell was at Cambridge when Rivers and Myers published these works. Al-
though he may have met Myers before 1914, that matters not for my point, which is to indicate
what knowledge was available whether Russell availed himself of it or not.
43 On Emil Emmert’s law, see Edwin G. Boring, Sensation and Perception in the History of Exper-
imental Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Croૡs, 1942), 292–3, 310.
44 The connection between the size–distance invariance relation and Emmert’s law has fre-
quently been discussed. I assume here that Emmert’s law relates visual angle (as perceived) with
distance (as perceived). For a review of the earlier literature that raises interpretive questions
about Emmert’s own intentions, see William Epstein, John Park, and Albert Casey, “The Current
Status of the Size-DistanceHypotheses,” inPsychological Bulletin 58 (1961), 491–514. In any event,
a recent review of the constancy literature ૝nds that the “vast majority” of studies validate the
size–distance invariance relation: Mark Wagner, The Geometries of Visual Space (Mahwah, N. J.:
Erlbaum, 2006), 226. Many psychologists use the term “size–distance invariance hypothesis”
rather than “relation.”
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Fig. 2: Part (a) illustrates the size–distance invariance relation and Emmert’s law. Assume that
the a૝erimage is formed by segment A, which is perceived to be at the distance shown from the
perceiver P. Then, if the a૝erimage is perceived at distances B, C, or D, it is perceived as being
correspondingly smaller or larger. These relations work whether the perceiver veridically per-
ceives the distances, or underrepresents them. Part (b) shows the geometrical relation in which
the visual angle subtended by a penny decreases with increasing distance from the perceiver.
is perceived accurately, then the penny should appear of constant size as it re-
cedes.⁴⁵ That is, its size should be perceived veridically, so long as its distance is
perceived veridically. Again there is no direct contradiction, because Russell has
not made explicit whether or not the distance is perceived veridically. But trouble
is brewing, since Russell indicates (by calling the private spaces “three-dimen-
sional”) that the penny is seen at a distance. Further, if Russell accepts Stout’s
problem as stated above, that the various sense data are supposed to be “in the
same place,” then hemust assume that the distance is perceived to increase as the
viewer’s actual distance from the penny increases; otherwise, the di૗ering sense
data of the penny would not be in danger of being perceived as being at the same
45 For convenience’s sake, I speak of Russell’s penny as if it were amaterial object at a location in
relation to a perceiver. Of course, for Russell, this notion of the penny is constructed from private
spaces in which a penny datum is at a distance from the from-which, that is, from the location
from which the datum is perceived.
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place at the same time. In that case, a contradiction with Rivers ensues; for, if the
members of the series of sensedata of thepennyat the at-which areperceivedas all
being in the same place (that is, at correspondingly appropriate distances in pri-
vate space so that they would be constructed as being in the same place), then as
the from-which recedes from the at-which, the perceived distance between them
must increase appropriately.⁴⁶ But if the increasing distance between at-which
and from-which is perceived veridically, then the sense data will all be perceived
as having the object’s true size (the actual size of a penny), not as being smaller
with increasing distance, as Russell reports them to be.
5 Problems and Prospects for Russell’s Ordering
Themore sophisticated psychological accounts of Sully and Rivers raise problems
for understanding the structure of the private spaces in the six-dimensional space
of Russell’s “breakthrough.” The problems are, to begin with, not technical but
interpretive. They are not technical, for in this case a technical problem can arise
only once we have settled on an interpretation of what Russell means to be assert-
ing in the various passages scouted above, when he speaks of “apparent size” and
describes the size of the penny as diminishing with increasing distance between
its location and the place from which it is perceived.
Reૠecting on the relations among apparent size, visual angle, and perceived
distance as reviewed above, there are several options for interpreting what Rus-
sell means. Although it is not clear that any of the more plausible interpretations
of what Russell intended to say are in the end coherent, we may be able to repair
things on his behalf. Here are the positions that are initially plausible as interpre-
tations of Russell’s intent:
1. Thepennydata are located in the sameplace at-which, and they appear in that
place to be increasingly smaller as the distance to the from-which increases.
2. The penny data that diminish in size are perceived as being in the eye or at the
eye, and these data are then, as result of experience, overlooked in favor of a
perception of the penny in its true location with its true size.
46 I am assuming for now that the distances in question in the private spaces can be ascertained
by reference to or comparisonwith that distance as constructed in the public space. This assump-
tion is reasonable, as the public space locations are built upon relations among the spatial struc-
tures of the private spaces. Of course, Russell could decide that this was not the case, because
assuming it to be so creates a problem for something else he believes. I take up this possibility in
the next section.
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3. The penny is perceived as being at its true distance and with its true size,
but the visual angle diminishes as the distance between the at-which and the
from-which increases and the perceiver notices this and says that the penny
“looks smaller” with increasing distance.
The ૝rst position (1) would be Russell’s intent if he accepted Stout’s problem as
formulated, according to which the data at the at-which are in danger of all being
in the same place, and so in private space they are at appropriate distances from
the from-which so as to be related to the same location in public space. The main
problem with (1) is that it violates the size-distance invariance relation (and Em-
mert’s law). If the penny data appear to be at increasing (veridical) distances as
the from-which moves back and yet also appear to be smaller, then their visual
angles must decrease even more than is called for by geometry. For if the visual
angle decreased as geometry requires and if distance were perceived veridically,
the pennydatawould appearwith their veridical sizes, notwith diminishing sizes.
So if Russell stickswith (1), he violates the basic geometry of size and distance per-
ception.
Position (2) would have Russell relying on the historical positions of Berkeley
and Reid or the notion of overlooked “sensations” employed by Stout. It conforms
to texts that seem to hint of particulars or data radiating from the object;⁴⁷ in the
case of the penny, the smaller “at-which” sizes would occur at the from-which
locations and would diminish regularly with distance. There are two problems
with this interpretation of Russell’s intent. First, he doesn’t explicitly say that the
ever smaller penny data appear to be in the eye or at the eye. Indeed, in describ-
ing his private spaces or perspectives as three-dimensional, he suggests that the
at-which is perceived to be some distance from the from-which. Second, and per-
haps more decisively, aૡer the breakthrough he doesn’t describe the decreasing
apparent sizes of the penny as something that must be uncovered. His report that
penny data appear smaller with increasing distance is o૗ered as a description of
perceptual experience and he doesn’t describe the “real size” as something that
is constructed by taking distance into account in relation to penny data (as he did
before the breakthrough). Rather, he speaks of the “real size” of a thing as the size
that it appears to have as the distance to it approaches zero.⁴⁸ (For an extent near
the surface of the eye, linear size is close to retinal size.) In any case, (2) doesn’t
47 e.g., UCM, 102–3: “At every place between us and the sun, we said, there is to be a particular
which is to be a member of the sun as it was a few minutes ago.” However, such passages might
also be interpreted as indicating that the various from-whiches of the perspectives are at “every
place” between us and the sun.
48 RSDP, 121–2.
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૝t his post-breakthrough position very well.
Position (3) has the advantage that it accords with Emmert’s law and o૗ers
Russell a way to ૝t his description to the textbook perceptual science of his time.
It has him suggesting that size constancy is achievedwith the penny, but nonethe-
less visual angle decreases with increasing distance. Accordingly, Russell’s de-
scription of the penny data as looking smaller with increasing distance would be
a remark, not on the perceived sizes of the penny data, but on the decreasing vi-
sual angle. As an interpretation of Russell’s intent, (3) is not very plausible. Al-
though he brieૠy mentions increasing size in the “૝eld of vision” with decreasing
distance in “Ultimate Constituents,” he does not integrate this into a discussion
that includes a description of size constancy. In any case, in the more extensive
discussion in “Relation of Sense-Data,” he regularly speaks of the penny as ap-
pearing smaller with greater distance.
None of positions (1) to (3) is satisfactory as an interpretation of Russell’s in-
tent, but for di૗erent reasons: (1) is unsatisfactory on technical grounds, while (2)
and (3) do not harmonize well with the relevant texts.
We can, however, formulate a fourth position that is technically acceptable
and that accords with his basic phenomenal observation that the penny both (a)
looks to be at a distance and (b) looks smaller with greater distance.
4. The relation among perceived size, visual angle, and perceived distance in
Emmert’s law is preserved, but as the from-which recedes from the location of
the penny, the distance to the “real” location of the penny is underperceived
in such a way that the penny data are perceived as being closer and smaller
than they would be if size constancy obtained.
Position (4) is technically soundwith respect to Emmert’s law. It has the advantage
of preserving Russell’s phenomenal description, inwhich the penny looks smaller
(the penny data appear smaller) with increasing viewing distance. So far, it is
better o૗ than the previous positions. However, it introduces phenomenal facts
that Russell doesn’t mention, and it makes his constructive project harder to carry
out.
The unmentioned phenomenal facts concern the underrepresentation of dis-
tance, an underrepresentation that increases with viewing distance. The fact that
Russell doesn’t mention these facts is consistent with his scattered remarks ac-
cording to which distance perception isn’t particularly good, especially at farther
distances.⁴⁹ It is not so consistent with the implication that the data in the pri-
vate spaces are very well known, for it entails that Russell overlooked or didn’t
49 OKEW, 73: “It seems probable that distances, provided they are not too great, are actually
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feel the need to describe a basic fact about his hard data. Nonetheless, it may be
consistent with his use of the private spaces as the basis for the construction of
the common physical space.
We have seen that, in this construction, Russell must rely on comparisons
among private spaces in establishing a serial order of the from-whiches. This se-
rial order then establishes points or spatial units in public space. Leaving aside
problems of ambiguity thatmight arise (e.g., in distinguishing on the basis of phe-
nomenal size a penny at a shorter distance from a quarter at a longer distance), he
would be able to establish a series. For according to (4), the penny data do di-
minish regularly in size with increasing distance. Unlike (1), these data aren’t all
referred to the same location in relation to physical space (or to counterpart dis-
tance relations in private space). Nor do they track veridical distance in the private
spaces, as in (3). As the from-which recedes from the “real” location of the penny,
the phenomenal distance to the penny data at the at-which increases but not at
the same rate as the increasing distance to the “real” location. This means that
the private spaces include a regular separation, with increased viewing distance,
between the at-which and the “real” location. That fact puts an extra wrinkle in
Russell’s constructive problem. But it may only make the construction more com-
plicated, without (on the grounds we are discussing) making it impossible.
Position (4) may not be the best interpretation of Russell’s intent, as it is un-
clear that hewas responsive to the phenomenal relations that it implies. However,
(4) might well be an improvement on his actual position. It takes into account
some experimental ૝ndings from Russell’s day that suggest just such a contrac-
tion in visual space (an underrepresentation of distance that increases with dis-
tance). These ૝ndings were made by the German-speaking sensory psychologists
FranzHillebrand andWalter Blumenfeld.⁵⁰ Their work has received only sporadic
given more or less roughly in sight”; he backs o૗ slightly in Philosophy (New York: Norton, 1927),
138: “It is still an open question whether the space of sight has depth, or is merely a surface, as
Berkeley contended.”
50 Franz Hillebrand, “Theorie der scheinbaren Grösse beim binokularen Sehen,” in Denkschri૟
der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenscha૟en Wien, Mathematisch-Naturwissenscha૟liche Clas-
se 72 (1902), 255–307; Walter Blumenfeld, “Untersuchungen über die scheinbare Grösse im Seh-
raume,” in Zeitschri૟ für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane 65 (1913), 241–404. For dis-
cussions of their work and its application to the problem of constancy and the observation that
things look smaller in the distance, see: Boring, Sensation and Perception, 294–6, and “Visual
Perception as Invariance,” in Psychological Review 59 (1952), 141–8; and Hat૝eld, “Representa-
tion and Constraints: The Inverse Problem and the Structure of Visual Space,” in Acta Psycho-
logica 114 (2003), 355–78, “On Perceptual Constancy,” in Perception and Cognition: Essays in the
Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 178–211, and “Phenomenal and Cog-
nitive Factors in Spatial Perception,” in Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy,
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recognition in the century since it was published.⁵¹ But the results remain inter-
esting today. In the context of Russell’s project, they would seem to o૗er him
a better description of his private spaces, one that accords with the phenomenal
diminution of the pennywith distance, without violating the basic laws of size and
distance perception. If distance is increasingly underrepresented, then the penny
data will appear at a distance, which is consistent with the three-dimensionality
of the private spaces; but they will also appear increasingly smaller with distance.
In this way, these results would allow Russell to put psychology in the service of
epistemology, a stated aim of Our Knowledge.⁵² The psychology would be more
sophisticated than the textbook commonplaces that Russell incorporates into his
own discussion.
6 Russell’s Progress
If this reconstruction of Russell’s position aૡer the breakthrough is correct, it sug-
gests that his new insight was not as path-breaking as he might have imagined.
Themore textually plausible readings of his position aૡer the breakthrough either
have dire technical problems or turn out not to ૝t the texts very well. Position (4),
which is technically more acceptable, does not fully ૝t the texts, either, although
it allows Russell to retain the decrease in phenomenal size with distance. With
respect to Russell’s ordering in terms of phenomenal size, the technically better
position would permit him to pursue his ordering of perspectives into series that
allow for construction of the all-embracing physical space. From our viewpoint,
it permits us to see how Russell could have elaborated his insight, had he delved
more deeply into the psychological literature of his time.
As it happens, Russell’s subsequent fascinationwith the project took him ૝rst
to an encounterwith behaviorism (thoughbynomeans awholesale adoption of its
tenets) in the Analysis of Mind, and then, in the Analysis of Matter, on to a deeper
analysis of the theory of matter as constructed from sense data now rendered (un-
ed. G. Hat૝eld and S. Allred (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 35–62.
51 The contraction found by Hillebrand and Blumenfeld has been used in arguing that visual
space is hyperbolic non-Euclidean: Rudolf K. Luneburg, Mathematical Analysis of Binocular Vi-
sion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947); also, Patrick A. Heelan, Space-Perception and
the Philosophy of Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). For discussion, see Hat-
૝eld, “Phenomenal and Cognitive Factors.”
52 On Russell’s conception of how psychology can aid epistemology, see Hat૝eld, “Psychology,
Epistemology, and the Problem of the External World: Russell and Before,” in The Historic Turn
in Analytic Philosophy, ed. E. Reck (London: Palgrave Macmillan, in press).
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der the inૠuence of James’s neutral monism) as “momentary particulars.”⁵³ In
these further developments, and especially in the Analysis of Matter, the distinc-
tion between the from-which and the at-which that arose with the breakthrough
remain important in ways that are crucial to understanding Russell’s ongoing de-
velopment. But to address the importance of this distinction in that work would
take us beyond the breakthrough itself, a moment that yielded some progress in
Russell’s analysis of phenomenal space, but not as much as was available to him
had he probed more deeply into the psychological science of his time.
Finally, we can conclude that, both at the time of the breakthrough and in
Matter, empirical knowledge of phenomenal spatial looks is absolutely important
to Russell. One cannot arrive at a theory of the spatial structure of physical space
without it. In this way, Russell di૗ers from Kant. In Kant’s critical philosophy, the
structure of physical space is determined by the geometrical structures that must
unfold in experience in accordance with space as an a priori form of intuition.⁵⁴
Thus, physical bodies and physical space must conform a priori to geometry, that
is, in Kant’s thinking, to the geometry of Euclid.⁵⁵ This remains so even if (some
of) Kant’s arguments for the a priori intuitional nature of space are separate from
this theory of geometry.
In contrast, for Russell in the period we have been considering, all knowledge
of physical space, which for himmeans the constructedphysical space of everyday
experience and of science, arises from sense data. For the purposes of science,
these data may be as of measuring instruments and the results of physical tests.
Even so, or decidedly so, the scientist must rely on sense data for knowledge of
physical space. It is not amatter of “contemplating” phenomenal appearances (as
Strawsonhad it),⁵⁶ but of constructing even ordinary objects from similarities that
are perceptually noted in the spatial structures at-which in relation to the place
from-which. Exactly how to carry out the scienti૝c construction of physical space
on a large scale was becoming an ever more intricate problem during the time in
53 Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: Allen and Unwin, 1921); The Analysis of Matter (Lon-
don: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1927). On the importance of the from-which for interpreting
Russell’s muchmaligned statement inMatter about the perceptual world being “in his head,” see
Hat૝eld, “Perception and Sense Data,” in Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytical Philoso-
phy, ed. M. Beaney (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, in press), footnote 7.
54 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), B 147; A 165/B 206; A 224/B 271; A 239–40/B 298–9.
55 Kant on the mathematics (geometry) of “physical space”: Prolegomena to Any Future Meta-
physics, trans. G. Hat૝eld (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), First Part, Note 1
(Akademie edition, 4:287–8).
56 Strawson, Bounds of Sense, 286.
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which Russell wrote. But that for Russell this process of construction must begin
with comparisons among phenomenal spatial looks is beyond doubt. This is one
of the ways in which, in relation to Kant, Russell was an empiricist.⁵⁷
57 Thanks to Bernhard Thöle for helpful criticism of an earlier version given in Berlin in June,
2011, and to Rolf-Peter Horstmann for ongoing discussions on this and related topics, including
comments on the penultimate draૡ.
